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Economic Perspectives on Free Speech
Daniel Hemel*
In Frederick Schauer and Adrienne Stone (eds), Oxford Handbook of Freedom of Speech
(OUP forthcoming)

The metaphor of a ‘marketplace of ideas’ has long pervaded discussions of free speech in
and beyond the United States.1 For early scholars of law and economics (L&E), the similarities
and differences between the metaphorical marketplace for ideas and literal markets for goods
and services were subjects of much attention. Aaron Director—the University of Chicago law
professor who helped to found the L&E movement but rarely reduced his own ideas to writing—
devoted one of his few published papers to the contrast between the laissez-faire approach to
speech and command-and-control regulation of other markets in mid-twentieth century
America.2 Ronald Coase, Director’s colleague at Chicago and ultimately a Nobel laureate, took up
the topic of free speech several times over the course of his long career3 and—like Director—
questioned the justifications for differential regulatory treatment of the ‘market for goods’ and
the ‘market for ideas’. Richard Posner, the intellectual successor to Coase and Director, grappled
with the subject in the first edition of his field-defining 1973 book Economic Analysis of Law and
in subsequent editions,4 as well as in later lectures, articles, and monographs.5
More recently, however, while the law and economics movement has flourished,
economic analysis of free speech has lagged. Although L&E has branched out from its traditional
emphasis on private law to topics such as criminal law, judicial behavior, and agency structure,
free speech has faded from its focus. Free speech-related papers are a rare sight at the largest
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L&E conferences6 and in the pages of the most prestigious L&E journals, and the empirical turn
in L&E scholarship has largely overlooked free speech as a subject.
The leanness of the L&E literature on free speech should not be understood to imply that
economics has little to say on the topic. Perhaps most significantly, the ‘new information
economics’7 for which George Akerlof, Michael Spence, and Joseph Stiglitz won the Nobel prize
in 2001 carries profound implications for free speech—implications noted by a handful of legal
scholars8 but not exhaustively explored. The new information economics challenges the faith in
free markets reflected in the writings and thinking of early law and economics scholars, and—
though less directly—the faith in a free marketplace of ideas reflected in much of US First
Amendment jurisprudence. It suggests that under certain circumstances, the regulation of
speech not only can protect individuals and societies from speech-related harms but also can
promote speech itself.
This chapter provides an introduction to the economic analysis of free speech,9 with
special attention to the new information economics perspective. Section 1 critically summarizes
the small L&E literature on free speech. Section 2 offers an overview of the new information
economics. Section 3 applies insights from the new information economics to free speech
subjects.
1. The Economic Analysis of Free Speech: A Critical Review
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A. The Early Years
Economic analysis of free speech arguably started with Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations
in 1776,10 but the modern L&E movement’s engagement with the subject began in the wake of
World War II, with Aaron Director’s ‘The Parity of the Economic Market Place’. That paper,
presented at the University of Chicago Law School in 1953 and reprinted in the Journal of Law &
Economics eleven years later, set the course for much of the L&E literature on free speech that
would follow.
Director’s approach to the subject of free speech starkly contrasts with the increasingly
formal and empirical thrust of L&E scholarship today. ‘Bearing in mind the danger of
generalization without empirical investigation’, Director writes, ‘it may nevertheless be asserted
with some confidence that among intellectuals there is an inverse correlation between the
appreciation of the merits of civil liberty—including freedom of speech—and the merits of
economic freedom’. Director continues: ‘Lacking empirical data for this generalization, I must
resort to intellectual pride as partial proof.’ Director then seeks to explain the dichotomy
between the intellectual class’s attitude toward free speech—’the only area where laissez faire
is still respectable’—and its embrace of government intervention into markets for goods and
services.11
Director quickly sets aside one possible explanation: that the freedom of speech is
enshrined in the First Amendment while immunity from economic regulation is nowhere codified
in the US Constitution. The ‘preference’ for free speech over free markets, he says, ‘goes beyond’
such ‘constitutional considerations’. Director then offers two additional explanations for the
contrast. The first focuses on the self-regard of intellectuals. ‘Everyone tends to magnify the
importance of his own occupation and to minimize that of his neighbor,’ Director writes.
Intellectuals, he hypothesizes, have elevated their own occupation (speech, broadly defined)
over the trades and businesses plied by others (producing and selling goods and services). The
second explanation, according to Director, is the ‘undue importance attached to discussion as a
method of solving problems’. In Director’s view, ordinary people rely on economic arrangements
to address the principal problems in their lives more than on politics. Market exchange thus
merits at least the same status as political speech.12
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A striking aspect of Director’s essay is that there is almost nothing in it that the
contemporary legal economist would recognize as economic analysis. There is no examination of
supply and demand or of prices or incentives. It is an exercise is normative political theory
without even the appearance of social science. Nonetheless, Director makes an important
intellectual move that guides later L&E analysis of free speech. By breaking down the distinction
between the marketplace of ideas and markets for goods and services, Director nudges later L&E
scholars toward applying the tools they use in the economic analysis of traditional markets to the
study of speech.
Following Director’s first foray, other important figures in the L&E movement took up the
subject of free speech as well. The British-born Coase, who had written a monograph on the
British broadcasting monopoly before moving to the United States, came to consider free speechrelated questions in his study of the US Federal Communications Commission published in the
Journal of Law & Economics in 1959. While that article is best known for Coase’s proposal to
allocate radio frequencies by auction, the article also includes an extensive discussion of the freespeech implications of the FCC’s then-existing licensing regime. ‘The situation in the American
broadcasting industry is not essentially different in character from that which would be found if
a commission appointed by the federal government had the task of selecting those who were to
be allowed to publish newspapers and periodicals in each city, town, and village of the United
States,’ Coase observes. ‘A proposal to do this would, of course, be rejected out of hand as
inconsistent with the doctrine of freedom of the press.’13
Unlike Director’s 1953 paper, Coase’s 1959 article is very much an economic analysis—
though without many of the technical accoutrements that one might expect to find in much L&E
scholarship today. The economic analysis and the free speech analysis are, however, split. The
overall structure of Coase’s argument is as follows: (1) A discretionary licensing regime is not
necessary to allocate scarce spectrum resources among competing claimants; and (2) given that
discretionary licensing is not necessary, the free-speech constraints imposed by the then-current
regime are difficult to justify. The first step of that argument entails an economic analysis of the
price mechanism as a solution to the problem of scarcity; the second step requires little
engagement with economics at all. Coase’s 1959 article thus illustrates the potential utility of
applying economic analysis to free speech-related issues, but not the power of economic analysis
of speech itself.

13
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Coase returned to the subject of free speech in a 1973 address to the American Economics
Association.14 The address traversed much of the same terrain as Director’s 1953 paper (crediting
Director throughout). Coase concludes: 15
We have to decide whether the government is as incompetent as is generally assumed in the
market for ideas, in which case we would want to decrease government intervention in the
market for goods, or whether it is as efficient as it is generally assumed to be in the market for
goods, in which case we would want to increase government regulation in the market for ideas.

Concerned that his remarks had been misinterpreted as an argument for greater
regulation of speech, Coase elaborated on his AEA address in an article in the Journal of Legal
Studies three years later.16 While again questioning the notion that freedom of speech outranks
freedom of economic exchange in the hierarchy of values, Coase emphasizes that his argument
does not depend on relative rankings. ‘[E]ven if the market for ideas were more important, it
does not follow that the two markets should be treated differently,’ Coase writes. If we assume
that government intervention in the market of ideas would be bad, and therefore that the market
of ideas—because of its importance—ought to be shielded from intervention, ‘why deny the
same advantages to those whose welfare depends on the lesser market, the market for goods?’
And if we think ‘that the government is competent to regulate and is so motivated to do so
properly, with the result that regulation enables the market to work better’, then why not extend
that benefit to the market for ideas as well? Coase does not hide his own view as to which of
these two alternatives—greater government regulation of the marketplace of ideas or less
government regulation of markets for goods and services—is preferable: ‘[T]hat regulation
makes things worse or, at the best, makes very little difference, seems to be the usual finding of
studies which have been made in areas ranging from agriculture to zoning, with many examples
in between.’17
Coase’s central insight—that parallel arguments apply to the regulation of economic
markets and speech—resonates more than four decades later. His analysis, however, yields
relatively few concrete implications for free speech jurisprudence. Coase believed that some
‘balancing’ of speakers’ interests against the general welfare was ‘inevitable’—and desirable.
Near the end of his essay, he writes: 18

14

Coase, ‘The Market for Goods and the Market for Ideas’ (n 3).
ibid 390.
16
Coase, ‘Advertising and Free Speech’ (n 3).
17
ibid 4-5.
18
ibid 32.
15

5
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3492827

[I]t is reasonable that First Amendment freedoms should be curtailed when they impair the
enjoyment of life (privacy), inflict great damage on others (slander and libel), are disturbing
(loudness), destroy incentives to carry out useful work (copyright), create dangers for society
(sedition and national security), or are offensive and corrupting (obscenity).

He does not, though, say much more on how judges should balance the conflicting interests of
speakers and society in any of these areas.
B. Posner and the Dennis Formula
Just as Coase was returning to the subject of free speech in the 1970s, one of Coase’s
colleagues at the University of Chicago Law School, Richard Posner, was developing his own
‘economic model’ of free speech. Posner included a short chapter on free speech in the first
edition of his influential volume Economic Analysis of Law in 1973 and expanded upon it in
subsequent editions. Posner further fleshed out his model in a pair of lectures in 1986—one at
Brown University and one at Suffolk University—which formed the basis of an article in the latter
institution’s law review.19 By that time, Posner was himself a federal judge on the US Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
In that article, Posner proposes to ‘give the free-speech icon an acid bath of economics’.20
From an opinion by his own judicial hero, Learned Hand, who served on the federal bench for
more than a half-century, Posner derives the ‘Dennis formula’ (so named for the case, United
States v Dennis, in which Hand supposedly intimated its elements). As stated by Posner, the
formula instructs courts to permit the regulation of speech if and only if:
V + E < P x L(1 + i)n,
where V is the value to society of suppressed information, E represents the ‘legal-error costs
incurred in trying to distinguish the information that society desires to suppress from valuable
information’, P is the probability of harm if the speech in question is not suppressed, and L(1 + i)n
is the loss to society from allowing the harmful speech, discounted to present value at the
prevailing interest rate i.21 Posner then applies this formula to questions ranging from defamation
to obscenity to copyright law’s fair-use doctrine.

19
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Posner’s formula has spawned many pages of critical commentary, including an insightful
1988 note by then-law student (now law professor) Peter Hammer.22 Hammer observes that
Posner’s algebraic formula amounts to a complicated statement of a straightforward
proposition—’that a restriction on speech should be upheld if the benefits of suppressing the
speech outweigh the costs’. In Hammer’s view, this ‘cost-benefit statement is true by definition’
once ‘one accepts . . . that speech is not an absolute value’. Put differently: ‘It is little different
from saying that the judge should always make the correct decision.’23 Michael Rushton, writing
nearly two decades later, makes a similar point. Posner’s formula, Rushton remarks, simply states
that judges should uphold speech restrictions if and only if the ‘cost of suppressing expression’ is
less than ‘the probable cost of allowing the expression’. In Rushton’s view, ‘[t]he inequality offers
nothing very controversial’.24
Upon further inspection, however, Posner’s formula reveals itself to be much more than
a tautology—and far from an uncontroversial statement. Posner, Hammer, and Rushton all
assume that once one rejects the premise that free speech is an absolute right (ie, once one
recognizes that there will be some cases in which the freedom of speech ought to be abridged),
the obvious alternative is to uphold speech restrictions if, by the judge’s own lights, the benefits
of suppressing speech outweigh the costs. That is a plausible position, but it is not the only
plausible position. A middle ground between free speech absolutism and the cost-benefit
standard embodied in Posner’s Dennis formula is ‘weighted balancing’—essentially, cost-benefit
analysis with a ‘heavy thumb on the scale’ in the speaker’s favor.25 ‘Weighted balancing’ might
be used to ‘smoke out’ improper legislative motives26 or to honor a constitutional commitment
to free speech ‘without imposing . . . a straitjacket that disables government from responding to
serious problems’.27 In algebraic terms, the weighted balancing approach would suggest that
courts should uphold speech restrictions only if V + E <<< P x L(1 + i)n, or—in English—if the costs
of suppressing speech are significantly less than the expected benefits. The ‘strict scrutiny’
doctrine in US First Amendment law—whereby a speech restriction will survive judicial review
only if it is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling government interest and does so by the
least restrictive means possible—arguably reflects this ‘weighted balancing’ view.28 So-called
‘intermediate scrutiny’—which requires an important government interest and a substantial

22
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relationship between the speech restriction and that interest—is arguably another type of
weighted balancing, though with a somewhat lighter weight.
The mirror-image position is plausible as well. The fact that a legislature has enacted a
speech restriction presumably reflects its own calculation that the benefits of suppressing speech
exceed the costs. One might argue that a court should displace the legislature’s judgment only if
it is quite sure that the legislature is wrong—that is, only if, in the court’s view, V + E >>> P x L(1
+ i)n. ‘Rational basis’ review in American constitutional law arguably reflects this latter version of
weighted balancing: there is a heavy thumb on the scale in favor of a provision’s constitutionality,
and a court will strike down a statute only when the balance tips overwhelmingly against the
legislature. Interestingly, while the US Supreme Court applies strict scrutiny, intermediate
scrutiny, and rational basis to speech restrictions of different varieties, US free speech law never
allows judges to engage in the unweighted cost-benefit analysis that Posner advocates.
Importantly, Posner’s perspective on free speech and the economic perspective on free
speech should not be seen as one and the same. As Rushton notes, ‘[t]he essence of Posner’s
approach is balance’—weighing the benefits of speech suppression against its costs.29 Balancing,
however, is not the only prescription that one might derive from economic analysis. Categorical
rules (eg, an absolute prohibition on viewpoint discrimination) may enhance welfare overall even
if they sometimes produce peculiar results.30 Posner’s perspective is ‘an economic perspective’
but certainly not the only economic perspective on the subject.
C. After the ‘Acid Bath’
Posner’s 1986 article is not the last effort at an economically informed framework for free
speech analysis. Daniel Farber’s widely cited 1991 Harvard Law Review article attempts a similarly
general economic theory of free speech.31 Farber succinctly summarizes his theory in a single
paragraph: 32
[B]ecause information is a public good, it is likely to be undervalued by both the market and the
political system. Individuals have an incentive to ‘free ride’ because they can enjoy the benefits
of public goods without helping to produce those goods. Consequently, neither market demand
nor political incentives fully capture the social value of public goods such as information. Our
polity responds to this undervaluation of information by providing special constitutional
29

Rushton (n 24) 715-16.
See, eg, Louis Kaplow, ‘Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis’ (1992) 42 Duke LJ 557.
31
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Rev 554.
32
ibid 555.
30
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protection for information-related activities. This simple insight explains a surprising amount of
First Amendment doctrine.

In contrast to accounts of free speech that ‘celebrate the Romantic ideals of self-expression and
self-realization’, Farber characterizes his account as a ‘very unromantic understanding of the First
Amendment’s protection of free speech’.33 His ‘economic theory of free speech places no special
intrinsic value on self-expression’,34 though it often lands in the same place as theories that do.
Farber’s analysis, while illuminating in important respects, also poses a number of puzzles.
He perceptively observes that, in a free market, the output of information will likely fall below
the socially optimal level because the producer of information cannot collect payments from all
who benefit from it. The unresolved question, though, is why the public good attributes of
information should lead to less rather than more regulation. As Kathleen Sullivan notes in
response to Farber’s argument: ‘Public goods are precisely those that the government does not
leave to markets but produces or subsidizes itself.’35 Governments do not respond to the publicgood aspect of national defense by deregulating it; they respond by providing it. The public good
aspect of free speech would, likewise, justify government funding for speech rather than a
laissez-faire approach. Yet sometimes free speech doctrine leads to restrictions on free speech
subsidies—a perverse outcome if the problem that free speech protection seeks to solve is, as
Farber posits, information undersupply. Farber himself acknowledges the apparent paradox.36
Sometimes courts strike down government subsidies because the government has selectively
subsidized speech advocating certain viewpoints but not others.37 In such cases, the legislature
may ‘respond[] by eliminating the subsidy altogether’, likely leading to a ‘lower level of
information’ than if free speech doctrine had not intervened.38
Comparison of information to other public goods further underscores the peculiarity of
the First Amendment’s laissez-faire approach if information production is the underlying goal.
Vaccines against infectious diseases such as measles are clear public goods. The US Food and
Drug Administration heavily regulates vaccines so that individuals can have confidence in their
safety. We take the opposite approach to political speech—which, according to Farber, is a public
good as well—even though regulation might give individuals greater confidence in the truth value
of political information. In other cases, governments boost the production of public goods
through mandates: homeowners must shovel the sidewalks outside their homes in a snowstorm,
33

ibid.
ibid 582.
35
Kathleen M Sullivan, ‘Free Speech and Unfree Markets’ (1995) 42 UCLA L Rev 949, 960.
36
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motorists must turn on their headlights at night, and so on. Yet explicit speech mandates often
run afoul of the First Amendment compelled speech doctrine in the United States.
While Farber’s essay aims to arrive at a general theory of free speech protection through
economic analysis, several other writers in the L&E tradition have sought to apply economic
insights to a number of specific free speech-related issues, including desecration laws, hate
speech laws, and libel and slander laws. Eric Rasmusen and Eric Posner both analyze laws against
desecration from an economic perspective. Rasmusen observes that laws against desecration—
such as flag-burning bans—address the negative ‘mental externalities’ that symbol desecrators
impose upon symbol venerators. He adds that allowing desecration will reduce incentives to
create and maintain new symbols. For these reasons, he concludes that US Supreme Court
decisions striking down flag-burning bans were mistaken.39 Eric Posner offers a contrasting view.
He notes that laws mandating flag veneration may reduce the value of the signal that veneration
sends, because everyone (regardless of patriotism) must venerate the flag. Alternatively, a law
punishing flag desecration may enhance the value of desecration as a commitment mechanism
for members of a ‘deviant subcommunity’ because desecrators—by breaking the law—’reduce
the value of their opportunities outside their group’ and ‘thus enhance their trustworthiness
within the group’. Given the ‘complexity of predicting the effect of a flag-burning ban on behavior
and beliefs’, Posner expresses skepticism toward the ‘claim that a law against flag burning would
have any predictable effect that would be socially desirable’.40
Other important work in the economic analysis of free speech has focused on hate speech
laws. Dhammika Dharmapala and Richard McAdams take up that subject, beginning from the
assumption that perpetrators of hate crimes seek esteem from others who share their
worldview. Speech can convey information about what actions will generate esteem. Restrictions
on hate speech can reduce the availability of information about which actions will be esteemgenerating. Dharmapala and McAdams consider several ways in which this uncertainty may
affect the behavior of potential perpetrators. For example, if potential perpetrators are riskaverse, then uncertainty about the amount of esteem associated with hate crime commission
will reduce the incentive to commit such crimes in the first place. This might strengthen the case
for laws against hate speech, though the authors emphasize that their model ‘highlights only one
factor that fits within a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis of speech regulation’.41

39
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245.
40
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A number of scholars have analyzed the tort of defamation (ie, libel and slander) from an
economic perspective, including Nuno Garoupa,42 Oren Bar-Gill and Assaf Hamdani,43 David
Acheson and Ansgar Wohlschlegel,44 Yonatan Arbel and Murat Mungan,45 and this author with
Ariel Porat.46 All these authors note that liability can have a ‘chilling effect’ on true speech
because potential speakers will worry about the litigation costs of potential lawsuits as well as
the prospects that fallible courts will hold them liable. Bar-Gill and Hamdani emphasize that
defamation liability also encourages publishers to invest more heavily in verifying factual
statements. Arbel and Mungan, as well as Porat and I, highlight the effect of defamation liability
on listeners’ beliefs. When talk is cheap—when there is no liability for false statements—then
audiences may ascribe less credibility to the statements they hear and read. Arbel and Mungan
argue that the effect of liability on audiences undermines the case for defamation law, because
defamation law—rather than protecting the victims of defamation—’amplifies the pernicious
effect of false allegations’.47 Porat and I acknowledge that defamation law potentially amplifies
harms to victims but also emphasize that defamation law also can facilitate communication by
enhancing the credibility of speech. (Section 3 returns to this subject.)
The emergence of behavioral economics opens up new frontiers for economic analysis of
free speech law. Christine Jolls, Cass Sunstein, and Richard Thaler briefly consider the subject of
prior restraints on speech in their field-defining 1998 article laying out a ‘behavioral approach to
law and economics’. Jolls and her coauthors hypothesize that court orders generate ‘endowment
effects’, causing the party that obtains the order to attach a particularly high value to the
entitlement conferred. The judicial hostility to prior restraints, Jolls and her coauthors suggest,
can be justified as an effort to prevent prosecutors from experiencing an endowment effect after
they obtain an injunction against speech. If such injunctions were allowed, prosecutors might
place excessive value on enforcing those injunctions even if subsequent information suggested
that the enjoined speech ought not be criminalized.48 More recently, Jolls analyzes visual
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Nuno Garoupa, ‘Dishonesty and Libel Law: The Economics of the “Chilling” Effect’ (1999) 155 J of Institutional &
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46
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elements in legally required communications—such as graphic warning labels on cigarette
packages—through a behavioral lens.49
The rise of behavioralism is one—but not the only—’revolution’ in economics that has
occurred since the early days of L&E. The ‘new information economics’, discussed presently, is
another discipline-redefining development. As the next two sections will seek to show, the
implications of the new information economics for the study of free speech are particularly farreaching.50
2. The New Information Economics
The ‘new information economics’ is not exactly new anymore. It began, by most accounts,
a half-century ago with George Akerlof’s 1970 article ‘The Market for “Lemons”: Quality
Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism’.51 Akerlof argues that under conditions of information
asymmetry, low-quality goods can drive high-quality goods out of the marketplace. In these
cases, either government intervention or private intervention can increase welfare. He illustrates
this point with an extended example involving second-hand automobiles. Akerlof imagines that
used-car owners know whether their vehicles are bad cars (‘lemons’) or good cars (which later
literature refers to as ‘peaches’). Buyers, however, have no way of knowing whether any given
car is a ‘lemon’ or a ‘peach’. They therefore are willing to pay a price reflecting the average quality
of used cars on the market—higher than the price of a lemon, but less than the price of a peach.
Lemon-owners are very willing to sell their bad cars for that price, but peach-owners are unwilling
to sell their well-maintained cars for substantially less than they are worth. Ultimately, the only
used cars on the market will be the lemons. That is, ‘[t]he “bad” cars tend to drive out the good’.52
Akerlof refers to this phenomenon as ‘adverse selection’ and notes examples in markets
for insurance, labor, and credit. He then identifies a number of institutions that can counteract
49
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the effects of quality uncertainty. Guarantees are one example. A seller may, for example,
warrant that a car is a peach and be held liable for damages if it turns out not to be. Another
example is reputation. ‘Brand names’, he observes, ‘give the consumer a means of retaliation if
quality does not meet expectations’, as ‘the consumer will then curtail future purchases’. A third
is licensing (or certification). A license to practice medicine or law—or a professional degree from
a prestigious institution—operates as a certification of proficiency. Akerlof notes that ‘[t]he high
school diploma, the baccalaureate degree, the Ph.D., even the Nobel Prize, to some degree, serve
thus function of certification’ as well.53
Tens of thousands of later papers in economics and other fields cite and build on Akerlof’s
elegant model. Of particular note, Michael Spence’s 1973 essay on ‘signaling’ posits that
educational degrees can serve to distinguish high-quality job applicants (‘peaches’) from lowquality applicants (‘lemons’) if the cost of a degree is negatively correlated with productivity (ie,
if it is cheaper for a high-quality applicant than for a low-quality applicant to earn a degree).54
Joseph Stiglitz, among others, has identified ‘screening’ as an alternative to ‘signaling’.55 An
employer may, for example, ‘screen’ potential employees by offering contingent contracts that
require an employee to pay a fine if it turns out that she has overstated her ability. Stiglitz notes
that such screening occurs ‘in a slightly modified form’ relatively routinely: ‘Individuals accept
low wages while they prove themselves; the low wages today are compensated for by high wages
later if they do prove themselves’, and ‘[i]f they do not, the difference between the low wages
and what they could have obtained elsewhere acts as a fine’.56 The difference between ‘signaling’
and ‘screening’ is that signals are transmitted by the better-informed party (in Spence’s case, the
employee who knows that she is highly productive and obtains a degree to show it) while screens
are set by the less-informed party (in Stiglitz’s case, the employer who seeks to distinguish highquality and low-quality workers).57
Despite the large and growing literature inspired by Akerlof’s initial article, one passage
in ‘The Market for “Lemons”’ has gone almost entirely unexplored. Akerlof notes that under
conditions of asymmetric information, governmental or private institutions can intervene to
enhance welfare. He then writes: ‘By nature, however, these institutions are nonatomistic, and
therefore concentrations of power—with ill consequences of their own—can develop.’58 Only a
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few subsequent papers—and none in mainline economics journals—have sought to make sense
of this remark.59
Competition is ‘atomistic’ when markets are characterized by large numbers of small
sellers who lack market power. Akerlof appears to be saying that the institutions that can resolve
adverse selection problems necessarily will have market power. In the used car context, CarMax
buys up old vehicles and stakes its reputation on its claims about quality. In the licensing context,
JD and MD degrees signal proficiency only because not everyone can get one—or, at least, not
everyone can get one from an accredited medical school or law school. The Liaison Committee
on Medical Education and the American Bar Association are near-monopolies in the US medical
and law school contexts. Warranties—which are another way for sellers to address information
asymmetries—do not depend upon private-sector monopolies or oligopolies, but they do depend
upon courts. We can think of courts as monopolists (or, perhaps more accurately, oligopolists60)
in the market for warranty enforcement. In all of these contexts, the solution to the adverse
selection problem results in the aggregation of power in the hands of institutions that are
sheltered from market competition. The implications of these power concentrations in the
speech context will be considered below.
3. On Liberty and Lemons
The canonical papers by Akerlof, Spence, and Stiglitz all focus on information asymmetries
in markets for goods and services. Their insights apply equally, though, to information
asymmetries in the market for information itself. We might imagine speakers as ‘sellers’ and
listeners as ‘buyers’, with falsehoods as ‘lemons’ and truths as ‘peaches’. In general (though not
always), truths are more expensive to produce than falsehoods. 61 Listeners, we also generally
assume, prefer truths.62 Listeners, though, cannot easily distinguish truths from falsehoods
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themselves. (If listeners already knew what was true and what was false, then speech would carry
no informational value.) As the share of speech that is false rises, listeners will be willing to pay
less for it (note that ‘payment’ here can refer to monetary payments such as magazine and
newspaper subscriptions or to payments that take other forms, such as political support or
esteem). Truthtellers, then, will be less willing to bear the high cost of producing truth given the
low price. Bad speech will tend to drive out the good.
The previous paragraph’s dystopian view of information markets is, to be sure, heavily
stylized. We may today live in an ocean of ‘fake news’, but truth has not vanished from the earth.
(Nor, for that matter, have high-quality used cars.) Starting from the stylized model, though,
helps us identify the institutions that address information asymmetries in familiar information
markets. Each of the institutions that Akerlof mentions—warranties, reputation, and
licensing/certification—have analogues in the speech context.
A. Warranties and Liability
Warranties in information markets take several forms. Occasionally, a speaker will
explicitly warrant that her statement is true and promise to pay a sum certain to anyone who
proves her wrong. The canonical example is Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Co, in which the
manufacturer of a ‘smoke ball’ averred that its product could prevent viral infections and
promised to pay £100 to anyone who used it as directed and contracted the cold or the flu
afterwards. One Ms. Carlill did so, caught the flu, and sued. The court held that the
manufacturer’s ‘prove-me-wrong’ offer was a valid offer that Ms. Carlill accepted, resulting in an
enforceable contract.63 A well-known American analogue is James v Turilli, in which Rudy Turilli,
the operator of a museum devoted to bank and train robber Jesse James, claimed that the outlaw
had lived with Turilli in a house in Missouri until the 1950s. (James, by all other accounts, died in
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Concept’ (2018) 26 Atlantic J of Communication 1; Raymond James Pingree, Dominique Brossard, and Douglas M.
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a shootout in 1882.) Turilli offered a $10,000 reward to anyone who could prove his claim wrong.
James’s daughter-in-law and grandchildren accepted the offer, established the falsity of Turilli’s
assertion, and sought to collect the reward. A Missouri court ordered him to pay.64
While the ‘smoke ball’ case and the Jesse James case are not the only examples, ‘proveme-wrong’ offers remain relatively rare. In some cases, courts have refused to enforce them.65
Daniel O’Gorman argues that prove-me-wrong offers ‘are usually not supported by consideration
and are therefore typically not enforceable as a unilateral contract’.66 The US Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit recently considered a defense lawyer’s $1 million prove-me-wrong offer
to anyone who could show that his client could have travelled from Atlanta’s Hartsfield-Jackson
airport to a murder scene as quickly as the prosecution’s timeline alleged. A law student tried to
take up the offer and recorded himself making the journey within the prosecution’s twenty-eightminute timeframe. The court refused to enforce the warranty. ‘The exaggerated amount of ‘a
million dollars’—the common choice of movie villains and schoolyard wagerers alike—indicates
that this was hyperbole,’ the court said.67
Aside from explicit prove-me-wrong offers, another way that speakers effectively
‘warrant’ the truth of their statements is by speaking against a background of defamation liability.
When defamation liability potentially applies, a speaker’s reputation-damaging statement about
another operates as a warranty that the statement is true and binds the speaker to pay damages
if it turns out not to be. Defamation liability can thus enhance the credibility of speech, which
then may boost the price that listeners are willing to pay and encourage more true information
to be generated. Ariel Porat and I have termed this the ‘warming effect’ of defamation, in
contrast to the better known ‘chilling effect’. Defamation law’s ‘chilling’ and ‘warming’ effects
cut in opposite directions, and the net effect of defamation on the quantity of speech is therefore
ambiguous. Porat and I conclude that US Supreme Court case law on defamation—which, in the
name of free speech, significantly limits the scope of liability—may be counterproductive if the
goal of the First Amendment’s free speech clause is to facilitate speech.68
Warranties and liability do not, importantly, avoid Akerlof’s concerns regarding
‘concentrations of power’ produced by institutional solutions to asymmetric information.
Instead, they vest courts with the concentrated power to decide what statements are true and
false for purposes of prove-me-wrong offers and defamation. ‘Ill consequences’ will follow, as
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Akerlof warns, if courts are biased against particular viewpoints. As we shall soon see, though,
the alternatives to judicial speech regulation will entail power concentrations of a different sort.
B. Reputation
Reputation is, as noted by Akerlof, an alternative institution for addressing quality
uncertainty. It is perhaps the mechanism most often used for quality assurance in the
marketplace for information and ideas. We in the United States rely on the New York Times, the
New Yorker, and National Public Radio to provide accurate information about national and world
events. We trust the New England Journal of Medicine for health information and Consumer
Reports for product information. Each of these institutions stakes its reputational capital on the
information that it publishes. We trust these institutions because we believe they have
implemented rigorous verification processes and because they have a lot to lose if they get facts
wrong.
Reliance on private-sector institutions with high reputational capital poses problems of
its own. Sometimes, the institutions in which we place our trust fail to live up to their reputations
for accuracy. Consider, for example, the New York Times’ publication of what its editors later
described as ‘misinformation’ regarding the development of weapons of mass destruction by
Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein.69 Apart from inaccuracies (which are inevitable in at least some
instances, even if the Iraq weapons-of-mass-destruction one was not), reliance on highreputation institutions results in the ‘concentrations of power’ of which Akerlof warned. The
publisher and editors of the New York Times—and their counterparts at other high-reputation
institutions—exert enormous influence over intelligent discourse and informed thought. Even if
the people who occupy these roles are for the most part talented and well-meaning, we may
nonetheless be concerned about the control over information markets exercised by individuals
who are neither democratically elected nor broadly representative of the backgrounds,
viewpoints, and concerns of the general population.
The discussion here highlights the tradeoff between liability and reputation in information
markets. Liability—whether in the form of warranty enforcement or defamation law—allocates
authority to courts to distinguish fact from fiction. Reliance on reputation makes institutions with
high reputational capital the arbiters of truth. The tradeoff is, as Akerlof emphasizes—ultimately
unavoidable when consumers (whether of goods and services or of information and ideas) cannot
readily ascertain quality.
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C. Licensing and Certification
Licensing and certification are the last set of institutional responses to the ‘market for
lemons’ problem that Akerlof considers, and here too, there are information market analogues.
Journalism degrees might be thought of as certificates of truth-seeking proficiency, though at
least in the United States, journalism degrees have not come to play the same certification role
that the JD, MBA, and MD do in law, business, and medicine (respectively). Journalism awards
such as the Pulitzer Prize serve an ex post certification function. The Federal Communications
Commission’s ‘fairness doctrine’ formerly required radio and television stations—as a condition
for their licenses—to provide accurate coverage of opposing views,70 though the commission
later concluded that ‘the fairness doctrine chills speech’ and therefore abandoned it in 1987.71
Licensing and certification play larger roles in some other information markets. Since
December 2017, the Independent Press Standards Organisation (IPSO) in the United Kingdom has
maintained an optional licensing system for newspapers and magazines. IPSO members must
adhere to an ‘Editor’s Code’, which sets forth standards related to accuracy and respect for
personal privacy. Individuals can complain to IPSO about inaccurate reports, privacy invasions,
and other code violations. If IPSO finds that a member publication has violated the Editor’s Code,
it can require the publication to print a correction and impose a fine of up to £1 million. (The
kitemark can thus be understood as both a certification and as a warranty.) Publications that are
members of IPSO can carry the organization’s ‘kitemark’, a symbol that denotes adherence to
the Code. IPSO has sought to educate the British public about the meaning of the kitemark
through advertisements with slogans such as ‘FAKE NEWS NOT WELCOME WHERE YOU SEE THIS
MARK.’72
Most newspapers and magazines in the United Kingdom have signed up to the IPSO
certification regime. Illustrating the substitutability between reputation and other institutions for
addressing quality uncertainty, however, the Guardian, Independent, and Financial Times—three
of the British newspapers with the highest reputational capital—have opted not to join.73 A
sympathetic understanding of these newspapers’ choices is that they believe they can overcome
the ‘market for lemons’ problem on the basis of their reputational stores without the additional
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credibility that IPSO membership potentially brings. A more cynical view is that they see IPSO’s
kitemarking system as a threat to their own oligopolistic power in the market for trustworthy
news.
D. Signaling and Screening
The emergent state of affairs in the United Kingdom—with most publications making use
of certification and a handful resting on reputation—can be analyzed in ‘signaling’ and ‘screening’
terms. A regime of opt-in liability potentially can ‘screen’ speakers who know more about their
own type than the regulator does. The IPSO system in the United Kingdom is binary (opt-in or
opt-out), but we also could imagine multiple levels of liability, with speakers who know
themselves to be more accurate opting for higher liability levels. Each level would be associated
with a mark or other designation that serves as a ‘signal’ of quality. Ideally, the system would
result in what the new information economics describes as a ‘separating equilibrium’: the highest
quality speakers (‘peaches’) would opt into the highest level of liability; the lowest quality
speakers (‘lemons’) would opt for the lowest level; and speakers of the intermediate quality type
(call them ‘melons’) would opt for more liability than the lemons but less than the peaches.
Signaling and screening efforts do not always result in separating equilibria, however.
Speakers of different types may opt for the same level of liability—a phenomenon known in the
literature as a ‘pooling equilibrium’. For example, purveyors of ‘fake news’ as well as highreputation speakers both might opt out of the regulatory regime—the former because they are
worried about liability, the latter because they think they can convey information credibly
without the boost from certification. High-reputation speakers might even have an incentive to
disrupt separating equilibria because effective signaling and screening may erode the value of
reputational capital.
The potential role of law as a facilitator for signaling and screening in markets for
information is a subject that merits additional investigation, and the discussion here is
exploratory rather than exhaustive. The key points are (a) that one size need to fit all,74 (b) that
multiple liability levels with an option for speakers to choose among them might have
information revelation benefits, and (c) that designing a menu of liability options that produces
a separating equilibrium among speakers will require much thought—and perhaps a certain
amount of trial and error as well. Such a system could go some way toward deconcentrating
power in the market for information, as both courts (or as in IPSO’s case, an industry self74
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regulatory organization) and high-reputation private institutions that remain outside the
regulatory regime will be competing power centers. Truly atomistic competition in the
marketplace of ideas, though, likely remains an impossibility, as Akerlof foresaw from the outset.
Conclusion
The law and economics literature on free speech has, for the most part, seen law as an
obstacle to a robust market for information and ideas. L&E scholars have not advocated a
completely laissez-faire approach to speech, but they generally have characterized the tradeoff
as between more speech, on the one hand, and legal protection against speech-related harms,
on the other. Richard Posner’s Dennis formula and Daniel Farber’s celebration of the First
Amendment as a subsidy for speech exemplify this perspective.
The new information economics suggests a different view. Knowledge asymmetries
between producers and consumers make the market for information and ideas potentially a
‘market for lemons’. Law can address that asymmetry—for example, by imposing liability on
purveyors of falsehoods—but at the cost of courts turning into arbiters of truth. The alternative
is for law to recede and reputation to play a more prominent role, though only at the cost of
concentrating power in high-reputation private-sector institutions. Perhaps the best that law can
do is to offer different options to different speakers, permitting some to rely on their own
reputational capital while allowing others to enjoy the enhanced credibility that liability brings.
A system that gives speakers the opportunity of unfree speech—that is, the option to engage in
talk that is not cheap—may, in the end, do more to promote a robust marketplace for information
and ideas than a system in which all speech is free.
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